conducted by France, Britain, Italy, Denmark, Belgium, Canada, the UAE, Qatar and Norway.
NATO-led operations prevented the fall of the rebel stronghold of Benghazi and a widely anticipated massacre, and after a period in which the frontline moved backwards and forward with alarming rapidity, the conflict settled into a period of stalemate. During this period, NATO and its allies continued to use force against Libyan targets, including command and control facilities. On 19 August, forces loyal to the rebel National Transitional Council (NTC) stormed Tripoli and the city was taken in the space of a week. Fighting continued around government strongholds until October, when the town of Sirte fell to rebel forces and Gaddafi himself was captured and executed.
As I argued in an article written with Paul D. Williams, the UN "e u it Cou il s espo se to the Libyan crisis in 2011 was significant for a number of reasons (Bellamy and Williams, 2011 Finally, because the Cou il efe ed to the responsibilit to p ote t (RtoP) principle in four of its resolutions on Libya -1970 Libya - (2011 Libya - ), 1973 Libya - (2011 Libya - ), 2016 Libya - (2012 Libya - ), 2040 Libya - (2012 overt pursuit of regime change despite the absence of a specific mandate to that effect, the suppl of a s to e el g oups pote tiall i o t a e tio of the Cou il s a s e a go, a d NATO s u illi g ess to ou te a e a egotiated settle e t despite spe ifi provisions to that effect in the resolution. These concerns prompted significant criticism from Council members, including two permanent members (China and Russia) and several significant emerging powers (notably Brazil, India and South Africa). They also gave rise, among other things, to the development of the concept of espo si ilit hile p ote ti g (RWP) by Brazil, which included a call for limits on Council decision-making (in the form of a focus on prevention and criteria to guide decision-making) and accountability measures to oversee the implementation of its resolutions. The intervention in Libya also reawakened lingering suspicions about the potential of the RtoP to be abused by Western states pursuing egi e ha ge. According to some analysts, partly as a result of this, there developed an atmosphere within the Council that hindered the search for common ground on other crises, most notably Syria. I deed, so e o e tato s ha e a gued that the Cou il s i a ilit to reach a consensus on Syria is effe ti el ollate al da age from the fallout over the
Cou il s ha dli g of Li a (Goldberg 2012).
This essay examines contemporary debates about human protection by the UN Security
Council and others in response to major humanitarian crises and argues that despite the controversies ste i g f o Li a a d p o le s i he e t i i te atio al so iet s response to the crisis in Syria, there are clear signs of an emerging international protection regime. The essay proceeds in three parts. The first section examines some of the legal and moral debates that have arisen with respect to military intervention for protection purposes.
The se o d se tio iefl e ie s the "e u it Cou il s p a ti e a d e eals a e e gi g new politics of protection. The third section argues that, although the use of force and other coercive measures remains controversial, there is evidence to suggest that the Security
Council is taking its protection responsibilities more seriously in that it is more likely to become engaged in protection crises than it once was.
Debating Intervention
Historically, genocides and episodes of mass killing have tended to end in one of two ways:
either the perpetrators succeed in achieving their ambitions or they are forcibly prevented from doing so (Bellamy, 2009; de Waal and Zilkic, 2006) . This cold fact is borne out by recent Facts like this pose a major challenge to international peace and security. For both liberals and realists alike, security has traditionally been understood as the purview of states, and two of the main guarantors of national security are the principles of sovereignty and noninterference. 1 According to this perspective, international security is best pursued through a society of sovereign states that enjoy exclusive jurisdiction over a particular piece of territory and rights to non-interference and non-intervention that are enshrined in the 1 For a good account of this way of thinking see Jackson (2000) .
Charter of the United Nations (Bull 1977 The value of this Westphalian system of security rests on the assumption that states are the est gua dia s of thei itize s se u it and reflect the values and moral preferences of the communities they house (e.g. see Walzer, 1994) . In other words, the security of the state is considered important, and worth protecting, because states provide security to individuals and allow communities to flourish on their own terms. It should be clear from the preceding paragraphs, however, that this assumption is problematic. In the past century, threats to The debate about the use of force for protection purposes thus hinges on the question of whether a state s ight to e se u e a d f ee f o e te al i te fe e e should be conditional on its fulfillment of certain responsibilities to its citizens, not least a responsibility to protect them from mass killing. As a heuristic tool, it suggests that different positions can be plotted along two axes -the first relating to our conception of what is possible in world politics, and the other relating to which actors should be privileged (see Table 1 ).
2 For a discussion of Westphalian and post-Westphalian concepts of sovereignty see Bellamy and Williams (2010) . The first axis on Table 1 refers to the way we understand the potentiality and limits of world politics. Some theories of international ethics are prefaced on an essentially optimistic vision which holds that because dialogue and therefore moral consensus and the development of shared purposes are possible across diverse communities, so too is human progress. As a result, dialogue can foster shared visions of the good, and determined and ethical collective action can move humanity in a positive direction towards it. Immanuel
Ka t s isio of a pe petual pea e ought a out i e e tall th ough the egulatio of war and then by the establishment of a community of nations is a good example of an optimistic account (1903 [1795] ).
The alternative is a asi all fatalisti o t agi o eptio of o ld politi s. This perspective is based on the view that the world is comprised of culturally distinct units with different values that pursue their own, distinct, goals, with limited possibility for cooperation (e.g. Niebuhr, 1938; Morgenthau, 1948; see Lebow, 2003) . Those that try to impose their own particular beliefs on others will meet only resistance, often producing tragic effects that leave everyone worse off. This account is sceptical about the chances for progress, doubts that morality does (or should) play a role in world affairs, and predicts that efforts to spread moral values will prove costly and counter-productive. Simply put, the tragic conception suggests that it would be wrong to thi k that e e people to a t ethi all , hu a ki d s conditio ould p og ess o i p o e (Frost, 2003: 484) .
The second axis in Table 1 relates to an ontological question about what sort of actor should be privileged. For our purposes we can focus on the question of whether states or people should be awarded priority. It is common for theories of International Relations to privilege the state on the grounds that it is the principal actor in world affairs, the main source of order, and the bearer of international rights and responsibilities. This perspective also suggests that communities or nations have value in themselves. Nations enjoy a o o life a d ultu e, and should be free to determine their own forms of governance.
The e is a fit , o u ita ia s argue, between the political community and the state, and the latter enables the former to develop and protect its own values and ideas about how its members ought to live (Walzer, 1977: 87; 1994) . According to Walzer (1983: 312-3) , […] justice is relative to social meanings: there are an infinite number of possible lives, shaped by an infinite number of possible cultures, religions, political arrangements, geographic conditions and so on. A given society is just if its substantive life is lived in a certain way -that is, in a way faithful to the shared understandings of its members.
An alternative perspective privileges individuals as the only irreducible ontological entity.
From this perspective, statehood and its attendant sovereignty should be understood as instrumental values -not as ends in themselves -because they derive their moral value f o the state s apa it to p ote t the elfa e of its itize s. After all, humans invented states to fulfil certain purposes, not the other way around. When states fail in their duty, they lose their sovereign rights (Téson, 2003: 93) . There are a variety of ways of arriving at this conclusion. "o e d a o Ka t s o ept of the atio al i di idual to i sist that all individuals have certain pre-political rights (Caney, 99 : . Othe use Augusti e s insistence that force be used to defend public order to argue that intervention to end i justi e as among the rights and duties of states until and unless supplanted by superior go e e t (Ramsey, 2002: 20, 35-6) . Alternatively, historical accounts show that in both theory and practice sovereign rights have always been associated with responsibilities of one form or another (Glanville, 2011).
As Table 1 illustrates, and remembering that this is only a heuristic exercise, thinking of ethical positions on humanitarian intervention in terms of these two axes gives us four main clusters -optimistic/state-centred, tragic/state-centred, optimistic/people-centred and tragic/people centred -which offer different accounts in response to the question of whether sovereignty should sometimes be set aside in the name of human rights, different ways of evaluating specific interventions, and different ways of responding appropriately to the problem of mass killing and human suffering.
In recent years, important practical progress has been made towards bridging some of the moral divides evident on these questions. Most notably, the RtoP principle, adopted by even referred to the principle in a press statement on the situation in Syria.
Although the formal adoption and subsequent usage of RtoP was an undoubtedly important ilesto e i i te atio al so iet s o goi g e gage e t ith the p o le of genocide and mass atrocities, the Security Council has engaged with human protection issues since the late 1990s and has developed a thematic civilian protection agenda related 3 On the emergence of RtoP, see Evans (2010) .
to but distinct from RtoP. This shows that RtoP is part of a broader trend towards the development of an international human protection regime (Bellamy and Williams, 2011 Council -China -host state consent was a necessary prerequisite for all such deployments (see Teitt, 2011) . In practice, the caveats and problems related to consent resulted in peace operations employing force to protect civilians infrequently, and in most cases only against non-state actors (despite the fact that government forces were often equally culpable).
Over the past decade, the Security Council has also delegated authority to regional arrangements in order to protect civilians, as in the suggests that although Libya proved highly controversial and international society has failed to respond effectively to the crisis in Syria, there is plenty of evidence to suggest that underlying progress towards a human protection regime is being made.
Responsibility to Protect and the UN Security Council after Libya
To what extent has the Council s failu e to ou t a effe ti e espo se to the isis i " ia F o this ief s apshot of the Cou il s p a ti e, the e is little e ide e to suppo t the view that Libya has made the Council less willing to incorporate RtoP into its messaging and practice. Not only has the Council referred to RtoP in substantive resolutions much more frequently since Resolution 1973 than before it, the inclusion of RtoP language in Council resolutions has become much less controversial than it once was. What is more, as the situatio i " ia has ha ged so too has the Cou il s espo se, esulti g i a e i itiati e to eliminate chemical weapons and the direct use of RtoP itself.
A additio al sig that the "e u it Cou il s i a ilit to ea h a o se sus o ti el a d decisive action in Syria is not a product of a wider political backlash against RtoP and human protection more generally is that many of the measures proposed for Syria that were vetoed Interestingly, for our purposes, among those states that supported the resolution were some of the most strident critics of the NATO-led intervention in Libya, including Brazil, India, South Africa and Pakistan.
A few months later, on 3 August 2012, a day after Kofi Annan announced his decision to esig as the joi t e o fo " ia iti g the pa ties u illi g ess to a ide thei o it e ts a d the "e u it Cou il s i a ilit to espo d effectively, the General Assembly adopted a second resolution on the situation in Syria, again by a huge majority of 132 votes to 12. This resolution, principally drafted by Qatar and Saudi Arabia, proved somewhat more controversial than the first because it heaped all its criticism on the Syrian authorities and did not condemn atrocities committed by opposition groups, a problem identified especially by India. Significantly, for our purposes, the resolutio deplo ed the 
Conclusion
The UN, its Member States and other international and regional organizations are gradually becoming more actively involved in the protection of populations from genocide and mass atrocities. This suggests the emergence of a new international human protection regime, through which what were once seen as new practices (the use of force to protect civilians in peacekeeping) have become habitual and old thresholds (the use of force against sovereign states) crossed. This regime, I have argued here, was made possible by attempts to bridge the gaps between different moral accounts, achieved mainly through the nesting of humanitarian principles within a framework based on the existing international rules of coexistence. Of course, this common ground makes the regime less proactive than some would like, but it also makes it more legitimate and hence sustainable in the long-run. What is more, because the Security Council is a political body, and few decisions are more inherently political than those concerning the use of force, progress has been patchy and
inconsistent. Yet we should let individual inconsistencies mask evidence of the underlying changes evident in the practice of the UN Security Council.
As the Council and other actors become more active in this domain, so concerns about the mandating and management of the use of force will grow and, with it, demands for new checks and balances. In the long-term, these demands will have to be satisfied if the UN Security Council is to remain in the game of using all available means to protect populations from the very worst of abuses. That we are even discussing the issue in this way -as a problem of how to implement a shared principle in the hardest of cases -is testament to just how the emerging human protection regime has come. If it are to go further, more work will be needed to ensure that legitimacy is protected when force is used for protection.
Thus, the next stage of thought and practice on the protection of populations to be focused on the provision of better analysis about emerging risks, lessons learned drawn from the various cases described in this essay, and the strengthening of accountability mechanisms within the UN Security Council. Taken together, these would help create a strong platform for the continuing work of making the protection of populations from genocide and mass atrocities a daily-lived reality.
